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Abstract—We introduce and analyze models for the propaga-
tion of malware in pure D2D networks given via stationary Cox–
Gilbert graphs. Here, the devices form a Poisson point process
with random intensity measure λΛ, where Λ is stationary and
given, for example, by the edge-length measure of a realization
of a Poisson–Voronoi tessellation that represents an urban street
system. We assume that, at initial time, a typical device at the
center of the network carries a malware and starts to infect
neighboring devices after random waiting times. Here we focus
on Markovian models, where the waiting times are exponential
random variables, and non-Markovian models, where the waiting
times feature strictly positive minimal and finite maximal waiting
times. We present numerical results for the speed of propagation
depending on the system parameters.
In a second step, we introduce and analyze a counter measure
for the malware propagation given by special devices called white
knights, which have the ability, once attacked, to eliminate the
malware from infected devices and turn them into white knights.
Based on simulations, we isolate parameter regimes in which the
malware survives or is eliminated, both in the Markovian and
non-Markovian setting.
Index Terms—Random environment, Cox–Gilbert graph,
Poisson–Voronoi tessellation, interacting particle system, ad-hoc
network, data propagation, white knight, speed of propagation,
survival, extinction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Present day telecommunication networks are ill equipped
for the rapidly growing demand for mobile data transfers. With
the fifth generation of mobile networks, paradigmatic shifts in
the design of the network are on the agenda. A critical aspect
here is the roˆle of infrastructure. Multilayered cellular net-
works with possible incorporation of relaying mechanisms are
under investigation not only in the scientific community [1],
[2], [3], [4], but also in industry [5]. All these new designs
have in common a rapid increase of degrees of freedom in the
system. The central roˆle of base stations is reduced in favor
of an increasingly important roˆle of relays. In particular, also
the users of the system will be attached a relay functionality
in the system. As a result, the network becomes more and
more decentralized. Exploring the possible benefits of such
new architectures is in full swing in the academic and the
industrial research. For a survey on device-to-device (D2D)
communication in cellular networks see for example [6].
Of crucial importance in all these future scenarios with less
centralized architectures is a good understanding of vulnera-
bility and security, in particular of the way in which malware
(e.g., proximity-based propagation sabotage software or com-
puter killing viruses like Cabir or CommWarrior) spreads in
such networks [7]. For usual networks, a number of strategies
have been exploited by operators in order to restrict the spread
of the malware and to keep the functionality of the network
available [8]. For security in D2D communication networks
see the review [9]. However, the new challenges accompanying
the system decentralization also include the question how
successful these defense strategies can be in such systems, in
particular since the spread of malware (more generally of any
information) follows a different set of rules than in centralized
networks.
In this paper, we introduce a framework for the modeling
of malware spreading in an urban D2D scenario. One of the
main parts of this framework is that the high complexity of the
real-world system is reflected by a probabilistic perspective.
Configurations of devices in the cities appear as random
configurations of points or vertices, and their connectivity
structure is represented by edges between these vertices.
Similarly, the times at which data is transmitted along edges to
neighboring devices are also assumed random, which results
in a stochastic process of interacting devices. In order to find
a balance between describing these complexities and being
able to interpret the theoretical and numerical findings, we
will mainly focus on models that can be described by a set of
parameters of reasonable size.
We analyze numerically the speed of the infection spread
based on the system parameters, for which we introduce
two different updating mechanisms. We also evaluate the
possibility of tackling the malware by the introduction of
white knights into the system. The success of this counter
measure is then measured via its effect on the survival of the
malware over long times and large areas. Competition models
of this type have been considered in the literature for various
types of fixed network models and in a Markovian setting
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. However, the present paper
is devoted to the study of such models on particularly realistic
and random network models, also going substantially beyond
the Markovian setting for the propagation model.
II. MODEL
A. Street-system based network models
For the distribution of devices in space we adopt the
stochastic geometry model of Cox point processes and later
base our simulations on particular choices of environment
measure. More precisely, a Cox point process in R2 is a
Poisson Point process with random intensity measure λΛ,
where the directing measure Λ represents a stationary ergodic
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random environment. For example, starting from a homoge-
neous Poisson–Voronoi tessellation S, we define the (random)
measure Λ(A) = |S ∩ A| which assigns to any measurable
subset A ⊂ R2 the street length in A, see red cells in Figure 1.
This modeling ansatz is supported by some statistical analysis
performed in [16], at least for European cities. (Non-European
cities with more rectangular street systems have been analyzed
for example in [17].) In this example, since the underlying
homogeneous Poisson point process that is used to create
the Poisson–Voronoi tessellations can be parametrized by one
parameter, the density of streets can also be described by one
parameter, γ = E|S∩ [−1/2, 1/2]2|, the expected street length
in a unit area. In our applications, the quantities of interest
will usually only depend on the parameter γ, rather than on
the whole distribution of the street system.
To finish the description of a Cox point process, for a given
street system S, we assume that the devices form a Poisson
point process X = {Xi}i≥1 with intensity measure λ|S∩dx|,
see blue dots in Figure 1. Here, λ > 0 is another system
parameter describing the linear intensity of devices on the
streets.
For the network model, we use the classical Gilbert graph
gr(X) with connection radius r > 0. That is, devices Xi, Xj ∈
X are connected by an edge in gr(X) if and only if |Xi −
Xj | ≤ r, see thin black lines in Figure 1.
The network model thus depends on the three central param-
eters λ, γ and r, which correspond to fundamental characteris-
tics of real-world wireless networks and obey certain scaling
relations. For example, the product λγ describes the spatial
intensity of devices, i.e., the expected number of devices per
unit area. Not all parameters are equally accessible from an
operator’s perspective. For example, the connection radius r
depends very much on technology (e.g., LTE, Bluetooth, or
WIFI). On the other hand, the street intensity γ is given, but
it is different from one city to the other. Hence, results should
cover a certain range of values. Similarly, the linear intensity λ
depends on the number of devices participating in the system
and thus might vary substantially.
Fig. 1: Realization of randomly placed devices (blue) confined
to a street system given by a Poisson–Voronoi tessellation
(red). Edges (black) are drawn whenever two devices are at
sufficiently close proximity of each other.
Next, we introduce malware to the system and describe how
its propagation can be formulated.
B. Malware propagation models
So far, devices Xi in the system carry no information about
being infected or not, and there is no time component involved.
We start by labelling each device Xi ∈ X and write ξ(t,Xi)
for the state of the device Xi at time t ≥ 0. In the first step,
we only want to distinguish two possible states, namely S and
I, for susceptible and infected, i.e., ξ(t,Xi) ∈ {S, I}:
ξ(t,Xi) =
{
S : device Xi is susceptible at time t
I : device Xi carries malware at time t.
We then define the set of infected devices at time t by
I(t) = {Xi ∈ X : ξ(t,Xi) = I}.
We are interested in the collective behavior of a large number
of interacting devices given by the vertices of gr(X) as
presented above. Our general modeling assumption is that
a change of status of Xi ∈ X happens at random times
due to fluctuations in the system, and these times depend
on the configuration in the vicinity of Xi. Systems of this
type are often called interacting particle system and a large
body of literature is available typically for non-random particle
positions and exponential waiting times, see for example [18],
[19], [20], [21].
In view of the application to malware propagation in realis-
tic D2D networks, in this paper, we use an extended framework
where instead of fixed geometries, the underlying geometric
model is random and given by gr(X). Further, besides the
usual exponential waiting times that we introduce next, we
also study models with non-exponential waiting times, at least
via simulations, see Section III.
In order to introduce interaction into our system, we define
the jump rate of a device Xi to jump from a state S to a
state I as λI > 0 times the number of infected neighbors of
Xi in gr(X). At this point there are no defense mechanisms
at work and thus we assume that infected devices cannot
become susceptible again. Using the power expansion of the
exponential and the Landau notation, we define
P(ξ(t+ h,Xi) = I | ξ(t,Xi) = S) =
hλI#{Xj ∈ X : |Xj −Xi| < r and ξ(t,Xj) = I}+ o(h).
Here, the scalar parameter λI, the infection rate, can be used to
adjust the speed of the microscopic updates. We call this model
the Markovian SI-model. In the literature it is also referred to
as the Richardson model, see [22]. We have the following well
definedness result.
Lemma II.1. For almost-all Gilbert graphs gr(X) we have
that #I(0) <∞ implies #I(t) <∞ for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Let τn = inf{s ≥ 0: I(s) 6⊂ Bn}, where Bn =
[−nr, nr]2, then it suffices to show that τn ↑ ∞ almost surely.
The proof rests on coupling arguments for the propagation
process and ergodicity of the random environment. First, note
that
τn =
n∑
i=1
τi − τi−1 ≥
n∑
i=1
τ ′i ,
where τ ′i ∼ Exp(λI
∑
Xj∈X∩Bi\Bi−1 deg(Xj)) represents the
fastest possible crossing of the annulus Bi \ Bi−1. Here
deg(Xj) denotes the degree of Xj in gr(X).
Next, due to ergodicity, there exist a, b > 0 and m =
m(gr(X)) such that for all n > m we have∑
Xj∈X∩Bi\Bi−1
deg(Xj) < a|Bi \Bi−1| ≤ 4ari
for at least bn-many annuli i. There, E[τ ′i ] > 1λ4ari holds. This
implies that
lim
n↑∞
E[τn] ≥ lim
n↑∞
n∑
i=0
E[τ ′i ] =∞,
Using similar arguments we can show for the variance that
limn↑∞ V[
∑n
i=0 τ
′
i ] < ∞ and hence τn ↑ ∞ almost surely.
Although the Markov property has substantial advantages
for the analytical approach to malware propagation, the im-
plied description via exponential waiting times is a restriction
and also does not reflect some of the details of a realistic
transmission process. Since, from a simulation perspective,
the Markovian approach is not a substantial advantage, in
this section, we develop an extended framework for inter-
acting particle systems based on more general waiting-time
distributions. The distributions that we have in mind feature a
deterministic initial time step where transmission is impossible
and a maximal waiting time until which transmissions must
be finished. Further, here statistical input can be incorporated,
which might propose certain bell-like shapes for the density
of the waiting times. In the simplest case, we can work with
a distribution where the infection attempt happens at times
which are uniformly distributed in [c1, c2] with 0 < c1 < c2,
i.e., we have a density f(t) = (c2 − c1)−1χ[c1,c2](t) for the
iid renewal times.
We call this model the non-Markovian SI-model. We have
the following well-definedness result.
Lemma II.2. For the propagation model with iid renewal
times that have a density with support of the form [c1, c2]
for some 0 < c1 < c2, we have that for almost-all Gilbert
graphs gr(X), #I(0) <∞ implies #I(t) <∞ for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Since in any finite time window, there can only be at
most t/c1 consecutive jumps and hence the infection can reach
at most distance rt/c1.
In Figure 2 we present pairs of snapshots for the SI-model
with exponential waiting times and uniform waiting times on
[c, d], all in a finite ball. The simulations are stopped at the
stopping times at which a certain radius is reached.
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bi`22i bvbi2K Q7 SQBbbQMĜoQ`QMQB i2bb2HHiBQM ivT2 rBi?
  = 20 km 1-   = 1.2 devices/km M/ r = 300mX lTT2`
`Qr, h?2 J`FQpBM aA@KQ/2H rBi? T`K2i2`  I = 1
biQTT2/ i i?2 iBK2 i r?B+? i?2 KHr`2 ?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+?2/ i?2
`/Bmb u = 2.5 km UH27iV 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i2/
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`FQpBM aA@KQ/2H rBi?
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Fig. 2: Realization of randomly placed devices on a street sys-
tem of Poisson–Voronoi tessellation type with γ = 20 km−1,
λ = 1.2 devices/km and r = 300 m. Upper row: The
Markovian SI-model with parameter λI = 1 stopped at the
time at which the malware has reached the radius u = 2.5 km
(left) and u = 5 km (right), indicated in black. Lower row:
The non-Markovian SI-model with uniform waiting times on
[40 sec, 120 sec] stopped at the time at which the malware has
reached the radius u = 2.5 km (left) and u = 5 km (right),
indicated in black.
C. White-knights counter measure
Let us introduce a counter measure based on the presence
of another type of software, which permanently eliminates
malware. For this we introduce a new state G and thus
increase the local state space to {S, I,G}. Updates can only
be performed in this order
S→ I→ G.
In words, susceptible devices, once infected, cannot become
susceptible again, and only infected devices can become
patched. The reason why the software patch cannot be trans-
mitted to susceptible devices at once is the following. Due
to privacy regulations, only after an infection attempt, the
infection becomes known to other devices and only then
retaliation is authorized without explicit consent of the infected
device. The software patch corresponds to an immunization of
the device and thus G is an absorbing state. We call devices
in the state G white knights.
In order to have a Markovian structure, we assume expo-
nential waiting times for the patch installation with parameter
λG > 0, the patch rate. This leads to the following description
via generators
P(ξ(t+ h,Xi) = I | ξ(t,Xi) = S) =
hλI#{Xj ∈ X : |Xj −Xi| < r and ξ(t,Xj) = I}+ o(h),
P(ξ(t+ h,Xi) = G | ξ(t,Xi) = I) =
hλG#{Xj ∈ X : |Xj −Xi| < r and ξ(t,Xj) = G}+ o(h).
We call this process the Markovian SIG-model.
Typically, in our analysis, we will adopt a setting where
initially the infection is present at one typical node in the
network, which we assume to be the origin. This reflects the
idea that the malware is brought into the system by one device
and we start our clock at that time. On the other hand, white
knights have to be present in the system already at time zero.
Their locations are random, more precisely, white knights are
assumed to have the same spatial distribution as any other
device. In other words, at initial time, we will assume that
white knights form a Poisson point process Y = {Yi}i≥1
on the street system S, independent of the other devices
X = {Xi}i≥1. Its intensity measure is then given by ρ|S∩du|,
where ρ > 0 is another system parameter describing the
linear intensity of white knights on the streets. We note that
alternatively, a Cox process with joint intensity (ρ+λ)|S∩du|
can be realized and in a second step, devices can be labelled
as white knights with iid probability ρ/(ρ+ λ).
Like in the previous sections, also the white-knight process
can be formulated where exponential waiting times are re-
placed by more general renewal processes, which we call the
non-Markovian SIG-model, see Figures 3 for illustrations.
After having set up our models, in the next section we
initiate the investigation of the models with respect to a
decisive quantity, the speed of propagation.
D. The speed of malware propagation
One of the most important characteristics of any malware
propagation model is the speed with which the malware
spreads in space. More precisely, we want to assume that
the malware is present only at the origin at initial time and
consider balls Bu(o) of radius u ≥ 0 centered at the origin o.
Then, we define the speed of infection spreading as
lim sup
u↑∞
uEo[1/τu] = α,
where τu = inf{t > 0 : I(t) 6⊂ Bu(o)} is the hitting time of
the infection at the distance u. Here, Po is the Palm distribution
of the Cox point process based on the street system S given
by a Poisson–Voronoi tessellation with edge-length intensity
γ, see for example [1] for background on Palm distributions.
III. RESULTS
A. Simulations for the SI models
We will approximate α by αu = uEo[1/τu] for some fixed
radius u. In order to determine how fast the convergence is
as u tends to infinity, we estimate αu for different values
of u. As mentioned earlier, it is reasonable to expect that
u 7→ αu is decreasing, since boundaries of larger balls are
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  = 20 km 1-   = 1.2 devices/km 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`Qr, h?2 J`FQpBM aA@KQ/2H rBi? T`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Fig. 3: Realization of randomly placed devices on a street sys-
tem of Poisson–Voronoi tessellation type with γ = 20 km−1,
λ = 1.3 devices/km, ρ = 0.1 devices/km and r = 300 m.
Upper row: The Markovian SIG-model with parameter λI = 1
stopped at the time the malware has reached the radius
u = 2.5 km (left) and u = 5 km (right), indicated in black.
Lower row: The non-Markovian SIG-model with uniform
waiting times on [40 sec, 120 sec] for both infected and im-
mune devices, stopped at the time the malware has reached
the radius u = 2.5 km (left) and u = 5 km (right), indicated
in black.
more easily disconnected from the initially infected node in
the network model. Another aspect that works in the same
direction is that the spread of the malware should behave
almost independently in different directions. But, for the speed
of the malware, only the maximal distance in one of the
directions is taken into account. While for larger radii the
law of large numbers averages the growth over all directions,
for small radii, the different speeds have a higher variance.
Therefore, the expected maximum is larger for small radii,
although the expected growth speed in a given direction is
independent of the direction. In Figure 4 we present estimated
curves λ 7→ αu(λ) for different values of u, which indeed
show the expected behavior. In particular, we can observe
indications for convergence since the graphs start to become
closer for linearly-growing radii and linear dependence of αu
on λ.
Next we present the associated estimates for the non-
Markovian dynamics, where the exponential waiting times
with rate λI are replaced by uniform waiting times in the
interval [c, d] with c = 40 sec and d = 120 sec. The results
are presented in Figure 5. We can clearly observe a different
behavior of the curves compared to the Markovian case. First,
αu in km/min
λ in devices/km1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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λI = 1, r = 300 m,
γ = 20 km−1
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u = 20 km
Fig. 4: Simulations for the speed of malware propagation for
the Markovian SI-model for growing observation windows as
a function of λ.
the convergence with respect to growing balls is faster, so that
estimating α via αu for large u seems to be less important.
Second, and more interesting, there is no linear dependence
on λ any more but rather a saturation effect for large λ.
This saturation effect can be understood via the following
observation. For denser and denser graphs, the malware is
more and more able to achieve its maximal updating speed
c. This c, properly scaled by r, then serves as an upper bound
for the achievable speed. More precisely, the infection cannot
spread faster than one hop every 40 sec. With a connection
radius of 300 m, an upper bound for the maximum speed is
given by 450 m/min, when we ignore the additional distance
given by the street system. Let us note that this additional
distance can be related to the stretch factor of the Cox point
process, see [23] or [24]. There are two additional effects
that lead to the fact that this maximum speed is not achieved
for finite λ. First, the maximum speed can only be obtained
along a straight line. On the graph however, the stretch factor
encodes the shortest distance in the graph towards a large
radius, asymptotically. As the number of devices increases, the
difference between euclidean and graph distance encoded in
the stretch factor becomes smaller. The second effect however
is probably the dominating one for the shape of the curves
in Figure 5. The maximal speed is achieved if at every step
the minimal infection time is used. As the number of devices
increase, so does the number of possible edges between
devices (even quadratically). More available edges lead to a
higher likeliness to sample an edge with a fast infection time.
In order to further evaluate the convergence properties of
our estimates, we track the associated approximate variance
Vo[1/τu] ≈ n−2
n∑
i=1
(1/τ iu)
2 − (n−1 n∑
i=1
1/τ iu
)2
.
The corresponding curves for the Markovian setting are plotted
in Figure 6 in blue. We observe a substantial decrease in
variance for larger windows. This is not surprising since
larger windows provide better averaging with respect to the
waiting times. In other words, in smaller observation windows,
αu in km/min
λ in devices/km1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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[c, d] = [40, 120] sec,
r = 300 m, γ = 20 km−1
u = 2.5 km
u = 5 km
u = 7.5 km
u = 20 km
Fig. 5: Simulations for the speed of malware propagation for
the non-Markovian SI-model with uniform waiting times, for
growing observation windows as a function of λ.
less updating is involved which consequently creates more
variance. At the same time, in larger observation windows it
is even more unlikely to see clusters which contain the initial
node where the malware starts and which are also large but
do not reach the boundary of the window. Essentially, in large
windows only the infinite cluster reaches the boundary of the
window.
However, for larger values of λ the absolute variance
increases, which is simply due to the fact that the variance
measures the L2 distance to larger expected values for larger
λ. In order to see that larger values of λ lead to less deviation
from the mean, in Figure 6 we also plot the relative deviation
from the mean in red. The relative deviation is formally
defined by
Do[1/τu] ≈
√
n−2
∑n
i=1(1/τ
i
u)
2 − (n−1∑ni=1 1/τ iu)2
n−1
∑n
i=1 1/τ
i
u
.
This decrease in the relative deviation is due to the fact
Vo(1/τu) (in blue and black) and Do(1/τu) (in red)
λ in devices/km1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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λI = 1, r = 300 m,
γ = 20 km−1
u = 2.5 km
u = 5 km
u = 7.5 km
Fig. 6: Simulations for the variances (in blue and black)
and the relative deviations (in red) in the simulations of the
speed of malware propagation for the Markovian SI-model for
growing observation windows.
that more nodes, encoded in larger values of λ, provide more
updates per unit volume, which results in more averaging, i.e.,
less deviation. Plus, larger λ refers to being deeper in the
supercritical percolation regime for the network model, which
also boosts the effect that we just described, namely that in
large windows, for the boundary to be connected to the initial
node by clusters other than the (unique) infinite one is highly
unlikely.
Let us finally note that for the non-Markovian model the
variances in all distances are already very small for λ not too
close to the critical one, therefore we omit the associated plots.
B. Simulations for the SIG models
In this section we provide simulation results for the SIG-
models, where the counter measure is given by white knights
that are able to install patches exclusively on neighboring
devices that carry the malware. Our main objective is to
present simulations for the phase diagram of survival and
extinction of the malware. Here, we determine the critical
intensity of white knights needed in order to eliminate the
malware in the system for varying rates of the infection
transmission. Let us again fix the parameters γ = 20 km−1,
λ = 2 devices/km and r = 300 m.
1) The Markovian models: Let us start by giving an account
on the Markovian models. Recall that here we can fix λG = 1,
the rate at which patches are installed on previously infected
devices, due to time rescaling. In Figure 3 we illustrate the
system stopped at two random times at which the malware
has first reached the boundary of a certain prescribed centered
ball.
Note that we can observe that in general the spreading of
the malware can be divided into two main phases. In the
first phase, as the white knights are random and maybe rare,
the process has not discovered any white knights and spreads
unobstructed like the SI-models. In the second phase, the first
white knight has been discovered and a chase-escape dynamic
unfolds in which the patch starts to spread on the previously
infected nodes.
In the infinite volume, it is reasonable to assume, although
not rigorously proven in our setting, that, for any value of
intensity of the white knights ρ, there exists a unique critical
infection rate λcI such that for λI > λ
c
I the infection survives
for all times and infects infinitely-many devices, and for
λI < λ
c
I , the infection goes extinct on any infinite network
component. Let us note that this result is available for d-regular
trees, see [10]. In [15], for the case where Λ is the Lebesgue
measure, we could rigorously determine areas in the phase
diagram in which extinction, respectively survival, is present,
but had to leave open the precise shape of the critical phase-
separation line, and in fact also an area around that suspected
line, due to lack of monotonicity. To determine this line via
simulations in a much more realistic setting is one of the main
results of this paper.
In order to determine the critical infection rate λcI for one
given ρ, we have to cope with the fact that we simulate in
bounded observation windows. More precisely, in the infinite
domain we could simply define λcI = inf{λI : α˜ > 0}, where
α˜ is defined as α but now under the measure Po conditioned
on connectedness of the origin to infinity. However, in finite
windows survival is checked only within the window and
thus survival inside the window could in principle still mean
extinction in any larger domain. In Figure 7 we present
estimates for the probability that the infection reaches varying
distances u in finite time.
Po
(
τu <∞|o! Bcu(o)
)
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λ = 2 devices/km, γ = 20 km−1
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Fig. 7: Estimates for the survival probability, conditioned to
the event that a cluster exists connecting the initially infected
node at the origin to the boundary of the observation window,
for varying radii and in the Markovian setting.
As could be anticipated, the curves become more pro-
nounced in larger observation windows, since there we see the
general principle that it is highly unlikely to survive a long
time and then die out. In order to have a good balance between
computational complexity and accuracy of the estimates, to
find the critical intensity λcI , we simulate large windows and
check for which λI the proportion of realizations in which
the malware reaches the boundary of the window exceeds
60%. For this note that it is computationally cheaper to
run simulations in the extinction regime than in the survival
regime. This is simply because in the extinction regime the
infection dies out faster and hence our stopping criterion
applies earlier. Therefore, in order to obtain the critical values,
we run 1000 simulations (10 realizations of the propagation
model on 100 realizations of the D2D-network model) until
the probability to survive (in this case for the infection to reach
a distance more than 17.5 km from the initially infected node)
is larger than 60%. Note that the accuracy of the estimate of
the critical value depends on the chosen discretization in the
infection speed λI and the number of different white-knight
intensities ρ that are simulated.
Performing this step for multiple choices of ρ, we arrive
at the simulated phase diagram presented in Figure 8. Let
us mention that we simulated the critical infection speed
for white-knight intensities ranging from 0.1 to 3 in 0.1
increments, i.e., 30 values of ρ and increased values of λI
in steps of size 0.05 from 0 to 7. This would in principle
lead to around 30× 140 data points. However, we can use the
property that for an increasing number of white knights, the
critical infection rate has to increase as it becomes harder to
spread. Therefore, new simulations for increasing ρ can use
the previous critical value as a lower bound. This cuts down
the number of simulations to roughly 30 + 140.
The simulated phase-separating line resembles a straight
line, indicating a linear dependence in the function ρ 7→ λI(ρ).
One way to understand this effect may be to consider an
infected device surrounded by white knights. In order for the
malware to escape before the infected device receives the patch
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Fig. 8: Estimated phase-separating curve for the survival of the
malware in the Markovian SIG-model for two values of the
linear device intensity. The dashed red lines indicate possible
linear relationships. Below the line the malware is in the
survival regime. Above the line, the malware becomes extinct.
from the surrounding white knights, it has to be faster than
the minimal patching event coming from the white knights.
But for twice as many white knights, the first patch attempt is
twice as fast and thus the malware should also be twice as fast
in order to escape. This idea may serve as a rough guideline
for the understanding of the linear relationship.
2) The non-Markovian models: The difference to the pre-
vious section is that now infection and immunization at-
tempts are performed after non-exponential waiting times. As
mentioned before we choose for the infection the uniform
distribution [c, d] with c = 40 sec and d = 120 sec. Similarly,
the waiting times for the patches are given by [c, g] with the
same c = 40 sec and a g > c, which is potentially different
from d. This allows us to incorporate in our simulations the
situation in which the patches can be installed faster or slower
than the malware transmits. In Figure 3 we illustrate the system
stopped at two random times at which the malware has first
reached the boundary of a certain prescribed centered ball,
where we choose g = d.
As in the Markovian case, in order to simulate the phase
diagram, we start by estimating the system for fixed white-
knight intensity. Note that our propagation model has now the
three parameters c, d, g instead of the two parameters λI, λG.
By invariance with respect to time rescaling we can eliminate
one of the parameters. In order to create a setting which makes
it easier to compare the non-Markovian case to the Markovian
case, we decided to keep c and d fixed and vary g, since then
again, for larger g, the probability for survival grows. As in
Figure 7, also in the non-Markovian case, for larger u, the
curves become more pronounced.
Finally using the same approach as for the Markovian model
we obtain the estimated phase diagram for the non-Markovian
case, which we present in Figure 9.
Again, the simulated phase-separating line resembles a
straight line, indicating a linear dependence in the function
ρ 7→ g(ρ). This prediction needs to be further investigated in
future research.
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Fig. 9: Estimated phase diagram for the survival of the
malware in the non-Markovian SIG-model for two values
of the linear device intensity. The dashed red lines indicate
possible linear relationships. Above the line the malware is
in the survival regime. Below the line, the malware becomes
extinct.
3) The dependence on the street system: In this section we
analyze the influence of the intensity of the street system on
the critical infection speed λcI with respect to the intensity of
white knights ρ. In order to better compare the critical behavior
of the system, we keep the spatial intensity of devices fixed,
i.e., as γ varies, we set λ = c/γ. Recall that as γ → ∞
and λγ = c, the distribution of devices converges towards a
Poisson point process with intensity c, see for example [25].
In Figure 10 we present critical curves in the λI-ρ-plane
corresponding to different values of γ where we fix λ such
that λγ = 40 devices/km2. As in Figure 9, it is reasonable to
believe that the curves are indeed linear and perturbations are
due to simulation errors. We can observe a clear monotonicity,
where for larger values of γ, for fixed λI, the critical intensity
of white knights decreases. Note however that there is no
reason to believe that the decrease in the gradient of the curves
is linear in γ. We believe that the average degree of the devices
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Fig. 10: Estimated phase-separating curve for the survival of
the malware in the Markovian SIG-model for two values of
the linear device intensity. Below the line the malware is in the
survival regime. Above the line, the malware becomes extinct.
in the connection graph is the crucial factor for the gradient
of the critical curves. If this assertion is valid, then it can
help to explain the decreasing gradient of the critical curves.
Indeed, note that for sparse street systems and a fixed spatial
intensity of devices, the degree of the system is large, since
many devices must be positioned on few streets, with empty
space around them. On the other hand, for dense streets, the
degree is similar to the degree of the planar Poisson point
process. In this context, let us mention that, if we fix the
connectivity threshold r and the linear intensity of devices
λ and decrease the street intensity, the number of devices
and therefore the average degree of device decreases. For
γ → 0, the limiting rural environment, this would even lead to
disconnected graphs. This is the main reason why we couple
λ to γ.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on a random configuration of devices placed in an
urban street system of Poisson–Voronoi type, we first studied
the spreading of some malware through the system without
restriction. The malware is initially at the origin and infects
neighboring devices after iid random waiting times. In the
Markovian setting of exponential waiting times, we can clearly
observe a linear dependence of the propagation speed on
the device intensity. Here, the speed is measured in terms
of the malware reaching large distances. We support our
numerical findings by tests on the convergence in growing
observation windows and estimates on the deviations. In the
non-Markovian setting, where the waiting times are uniform
in a compact time-interval strictly bounded away from zero,
the picture changes substantially. The set of infected devices
becomes much more ball-like in space and the linear depen-
dence of the infection speed on the device intensity is replaced
by a saturation effect, where more devices do not increase the
speed any more.
Finally, we augmented the system by introducing a random
set of white knights with intensity ρ at initial time. We
simulated the critical phase-separating line of survival and
extinction of the malware in the plane of ρ versus the infection
rate λI, for different device intensities. Again, we support our
findings by tests on the convergence in growing sampling
windows. The main observation is that there seems to be a
linear relation between λI and ρ, both in the Markovian and
in the non-Markovian setting.
This leads to a number of open questions, subject to future
investigations. For example: How fast is the convergence of the
malware propagation speed for growing sampling windows? Is
there a shape theorem for the set of infected devices? Can
we determine precisely the phase diagram of survival and
extinction? What is the dependence of the critical curve of
survival and extinction on other model parameters, for example
the device intensity?
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